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Taking the Discussion Onward 
 
Tom McLeish, Department of Physics and Humanities Research Centre, University of York 
 
Receiving and reading the remarkable cluster of reviews of The Poetry and Music of Science 
(henceforth PaMoS) in this edition of the journal must rank among my most exhilarating academic 
experiences. To be engaged by such constructively critical, informed (far better than I), severe where 
necessary, pedagogically generous, creative and, above all, interesting thinking is a dream for any 
academic writer.  When colleagues put such collective thinking towards the project that lies beneath and 
beyond all ‘interdisciplinary’ work – namely a united conception of knowledge -  the extended 
discussion touches places where not only our minds, but also our hearts, find life and joy. So it is not 
the place of this final essay to answer, or respond in every point, let alone ‘rebut’ any of the forgoing 
pieces (it would not, even if I were qualified to do so) but to draw threads of discussion together and 
suggest the reading, thinking and writing that may constitute the next stage of responding to the 
questions raised or stimulated by the subject addressed in the book. 
 
Rather than take the reviewers in turn, therefore, I will try to tease out a few of the many threads that 
one or more of them raise, and suggest a continuation of the conversation. Some concern themes 
touched-on but inadequately discussed in the book, others reveal gaping lacunae, others suggest ideas to 
develop or to clarify. I have necessarily had to make choices under the limitation of space – surely 
another book could be written in response to each review -  but, guided by those issues that seemed to 
attract the greater number of voices, or which seemed to me most promising to pursue, I should say 
something more about: (i) historical context, including the origin of the ‘Two Cultures’ divide itself; (ii) 
cultural contexts of science and art; (iii) the ironic silence of PaMoS in regard to poetry; (iv) the 
differences, rather than the similarities, in creative processes of art and science, including the distinction 
between ‘creativity’ and ‘imagination’; (v) the social and institutional framings of science and art; (vi) 
computing and digital creativity; (vii) theological (and anti-theological) tropes in creativity and the 
fragmentation of disciplines. That ought to do for a start.  
 
 
Historical Framings and Questions 
 
The stance of PaMoS is variously described as ‘ahistorical’ (Whitworth) and ‘primarily historical’ 
(Huber). I think that the confusion may have two causes: firstly that, while drawing on historical 
examples, the book does not pretend to be a history, or even primarily concerned with historical 
questions. Secondly, its embedded polemic on the role of creativity in science chooses deliberately to 
stress continuities rather than differences. Fuller and Huber both point out unanswered historical 
questions, including the key puzzle of when and how the ‘Two Cultures’ paradigm emerged (in the 
West). I think these readers together imply that, although history is important to the story of human 
creativity in the book, that they take my reading of the human creative act to be as timeless and cross-
cultural as human anatomy. This is not, fortunately, my claim, although when the task is to challenge 
fragmentation and an accepted emphasis on difference, the rhetorical stress is bound to be on unity and 
commonalities. The history of scientific imagination surely contains its continuities as well as its rapid 
shifts, its  cross-currents as well as its slow evolutions. Without some notion of continuity, after all, there 
is no reference frame by which to detect difference and change. That said, these three reviewers and 
others make the point that, in investigations such as these, a proper appraisal of their cultural history is 
indispensable, and ‘timeless truths’ are chimeras.  I should have been clearer, for example, that the 
remarkable appearance of a form of the ‘narrative of human creativity’ in Anselm in no way implies that 
he framed his task or visualised his metaphors in the same way that a contemporary thinker would, any 
more than the ‘Discarded Image’ of the geocentric cosmos left the palette of astronomical ideas 
unchanged between medieval and modern astronomers. 
 
Prompted additionally by Hugill’s important point about digital creativity (see below), I am now 
surprised that I did not say more about the relationship between emerging technologies in history, and 
the stimulus that technology has always provided to creative imagination in both art and science, as well 
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as the technical contextualisation of the cognitive. There are implied examples of course, but a stronger 
cultural point could have been made. The musical example of Schumann’s Konzertstück is a case in 
point: culturally its innovation fuses a Baroque form with a post-Beethovian romantic style, but it would 
have been technologically impossible to attain its imaginary spaces (pace Hugill’s dissenting and more 
critical reception of the piece) without the invention of the valve-horn (Zon’s technical point here refers 
to the orchestral horns, as Hugill points out, not the solo quartet). The suggestive creativity that 
technology affords science finds fascinating personal locus in Hugill’s ‘cross-over’ people, like Lamarr 
and Biro. One could add Lovelace and Turing, and think about how the mechanical has informed the 
mathematical and computational imagination, as well as the other way around. 
 
A much more serious failure of emphasis on historical framing lies at the points where I draw on the 
full-bodied emergence of experimental scientific method in the 17 th century. Although this lies behind 
and beyond the more focused discussion of its relation to new forms of fictional narrative (in chapter 4 
of PaMoS), and of the heliocentric cosmos and visual imagination (in chapter 3), there is more to say on 
how the different thought world of that time offered paths for creative thinking that are no longer 
travelled today. Stephen Shapin in The Scientific Revolution nuances the mutual avoidance of 
‘presentist’ construal of this history of science on the one hand, while being careful not to reject all 
continuities, on the other. He also, more successfully than many other historians of science, stresses the 
process and practices of making scientific knowledge, rather than a purely evaluating their outputs. One 
of the salient ways in which such practice differed in the 17 th century from today, was in the customary 
routes to establishing consensus: ‘It is quite possible,’ Shapin writes (Shapin 2018), ‘that many practical 
problems of scientific credibility were solved by a device as apparently simple as the gentlemanly code 
of honour’ - a striking example of difference.  
 
There are other aspects of early modern science that require as great a rethinking of fundamental 
assumptions of method. The power and reach of experimental method is so obvious to anyone 
educated in the occident today, that it is difficult to grasp how great were the intellectual obstacles in the 
way of adopting it in the century of Bacon, Boyle and Newton. The contemporary voice that most 
clearly helps us understand the almost-overwhelming case against the new ‘experimental philosophy’ is 
that of Margaret Cavendish. Her opposition to experimental method as a viable route to knowledge of 
the natural world is a repeated theme in her 1668 (2nd edition) Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy. The Achilles’ heel of experimental artificiality is highlighted time and again; a good 
example is her discussion of various ‘sorts of heat and cold’ (Cavendish 1668 chapter 26): 
 
For if men conceive that there is but one heat and cold in nature, they are mistaken – and much 
more, if they think they can measure all the several sorts of heat and cold in all creatures, by artificial 
experiments. For as much as a natural man differs from an artificial statue or picture of a man, so 
much differs a natural effect from the artificial … Artificial things are pretty toys to employ idle 
time. 
Strong words indeed! For Cavendish experiments are toys for the boys (she is unabashed to gender her 
argument, reserving the superior contemplative philosophy for women). Her voice really belongs at the 
centre of an early-modern comparison of science and literature for another reason – the argument was 
even more boldly put in arguably the first modern work of science fiction, her fantasy Blazing World 
(Cavendish 1666). Cavendish’s rhetorical moves in both philosophical and fictional form juxtapose the 
artificiality and over-simplicity of experiment to the rich complexity and multiple forms of nature. Her 
preference in method is therefore for what she calls ‘speculative’ or ‘contemplative’ philosophy.  It is all 
too easy today to overlook the inherent difficulty of  human knowledge or conception of nature that 
persisted from pre-modern thought in spite of the innovations of the 15th and 16th centuries. However, 
there is an echo of continuity here too: Cavendish’s 17th century suspicion of the over-simplifications 
inherent in experiment find resonance in 21st century arguments of the relevance of in vitro to in vivo 
methods in biology (e.g. Lorian 1988). 
 
Picking up Fuller’s crucial point about the continued experience of divergences within science within a 
deeper history of ideas, makes me think of Aquinas (Summa Theologica, 2020), who had long before 
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contrasted natural science to theology in terms that anticipate Cavendish’s contrast of experimental and 
contemplative philosophy, or theology (‘this science’): 
 
This science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences 
derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its 
certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of 
its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend 
human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp. 
Even natural complexities that lie beyond ‘reason’s grasp’ were therefore beyond hope for the scholastic 
mind. When Shapin meets the inevitable confrontation of Newton and Boyle, he quotes the Newtonian 
response to both Aquinas and Cavendish ‘to bind assent in iron chains of mathematical and logical 
deduction, seeking to guide the mind along from necessary truth to necessary consequence’. When 
what is meant by ‘theory’ and ‘experiment’, and the relation between them, have all changed out of 
recognition in three centuries, it is indeed naïve to assume that a discussion of creativity in either can be 
completed without recognising that, and doing the hard historical work. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting historical question raised (or at least implied) but assuredly not answered 
in PaMoS, as Huber points out, is the historical locus and reason for the ‘Two Cultures’ divide in the 
first place. She draws our attention to the fascinating 19th century precursor of PaMoS, Robert Hunt’s 
The Poetry of Science (Hunt 1850) of which I was culpably unaware, and situates Hunt’s possibility of 
consonance in the findings (in contrast to my emphasis on creative process) of poetry and science. The 
ground of hope for this she situates, in turn, within the natural theology of the time (but see also the 
discussion on poetry itself, below), that provided a foundational assurance that all paths to knowledge 
must lead ultimately to the same point. Her examples of Tyndall, Whewell and Hunt himself make the 
point that an explicit discussion of imagination in science was thoroughly alive in the 19th century 
(though, see Whitworth’s careful historical nuancing of ‘imagination’ and ‘creativity’ – I and other 
commentators all fall into the trap of eliding them too easily). Fuller echoes the question, which he 
pointedly terms a ‘Second Fall’ in the history of ideas. One reason that I did not address this crucial 
issue in the history of Western thought is that I am completely unequipped to do so, but whatever and 
whenever the truth in the historical parting of ways, signposted by the amicable anxiety of Huxley and 
Arnold’s early discussion, of which we are reminded by Huber once more, both theological and 
aesthetic developments must have played out.  
 
Now when theology and aesthetics collide we surely ought, as others have urged me, to read Nietzsche 
more. The coincidence of the late 19th century proclamation of the ‘death of God’ and the loosing of the 
bounds of art and science as a sort of ‘second fall’, is too suggestive to be overlooked. At one point in 
On the Genealogy of  Morals (Nietzsche tr. F. Golffing 1956,What is the Meaning of the Aesthetic 
Ideal? 6,8), Nietzsche presents two opposing approaches to the idea of the beautiful, the first identified 
with Kant, the second with Stendhal. The fascinating aspect (to me at least) of the contrast is its 
proposed comparison of an impersonal and disinterested aesthetic of Kant to the personal, immersed 
and rewarding aesthetics of Stendhal, and the implied shift of primary aesthetic locus from observer to 
practitioner, from an externalised to an internalised experience. If Nietzsche is noticing a shift in the 
beautiful from the commons to the personal, then this move is indeed precisely opposed to the 
direction that Wordsworth anticipated could one day reconnect science with poetry. It is also a 
foundational move of late modernism that distrusts the claim of common truth as ‘institutional’ or even 
‘ecclesiastical’, and points to the primacy of individual readings. These observations may be of relevance 
to the history question of the Two Cultures, but in any case bring us firmly into the domain of cultural 






The most telling cultural critique of PaMoS is the occidental situation of almost the entire narrative – 
mea culpa. Could a case for a common pattern of creative narrative be advanced in cultures of the 
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Pacific, of South and Middle America, East Asia, Australasia, India, the arctic circle and more? They 
are important questions, and I cannot offer answers (plurals because there needs to be a sensitivity to 
translating what we now call ‘art’ and ‘science’ into activities across cultures and histories in which 
nothing translates simply, and in the face of the additional need to differentiate practice and purpose). 
Leach advances, echoed by Barnie, the most salient challenge – and it is no surprise that the 
anthropologists see this most clearly -  that the very divide between art and science that I have sought to 
bridge though both process and purpose, only arises in a Western culture that conventionally construes 
a separation between the human and nature, itself driven by a Western notion of transcendence. The 
alternative is a culture of flow, immersion and non-transcendent integration, of which anthropologists 
such Ingold and Strathern (who was an interlocutor during the writing of the book) have spoken. A 
clearly articulated example (I am indebted to Leach for this quotation) is given by animistic belief 
systems (Arhem 2016; 3): 
 
As opposed to naturalism, which assumes a foundational dichotomy between objective nature and 
subjective culture, animism posits an intersubjective and personalized universe in which the Cartesian 
split between person and thing is dissolved and rendered spurious. In the animist cosmos, animals 
and plants, beings and things may all appear as intentional subjects and persons, capable of will, 
intention, and agency. The primacy of physical causation is replaced by intentional causation and 
social agency.'  
 
Ingold himself, and in this journal (Ingold 2018) hints at a ‘softer’, more compliant and connected way 
of doing science, inherited from both his mycologist father and his fieldwork north of the Finnish Arctic 
Circle. The lovely ‘alternative scientific imagination’ which would emerge in a culture where the 
stereotypical organism were a fungus rather than a mouse, points to the very different possible framings 
of both science and art (Ingold conflates them) when cultures collide. In the same vein, Australian 
anthropologist Veronica Strang (2015) writes that a ‘lack of separation between the human and non-
human (or between persons and things) is common to many hunter-gatherer ontologies, and is generally 
coherent with a human-environmental relationship closely embedded in local material events’, also 
citing Descola and Palsson (1996). While this must be true in a strong cultural sense, there are 
separations that cannot be avoided (humans have skin – we are not Ingold’s fungi). The myth-making of 
ancient hunter-gatherers can only be guessed at from the symbolic artefacts that we possess, such as the 
wonderful Schwabian ‘Lion-Man’ from 50 000BCE that I discuss in PaMoS. But both chimeras then, 
and rainbow-snakes today, generate stories, and stories move from separation to reconnection; we 
recognise them sufficiently to ask questions and to construe our ignorance – they are not ‘noise’ (in the 
sense of Kermode (1968). 
 
Of course hints of an immersive, connected, participative science are not entirely absent from PaMoS – 
I am recalled to my fascination when coming across Emmanuel Levinas’ preference of auditory, rather 
than visual, models for thinking about the world. A fascinating extension of these sensory metaphors 
brings us back to Nietzsche once again, who (see Babich 2003 – I am greatly indebted to Babette 
Babich for pointing this out to me) claimed that ‘science aims to interpret the same phenomenon 
through different senses, and to reduce everything to the most exact sense: the optical’ (Nietzsche 1986). 
He stressed the philological link between taste (sapio) and wisdom (sapiens). A suggestion of a ‘ladder’ 
of higher and lower senses connects by implication the immersion of smell – even more so than 
Levinas’ auditory connection – to the objective.   My conclusion after the survey of PaMoS was that 
both immersive and distant perspectives were necessary, and both as fundamentally human. It is no 
surprise, once one has read Iain McGilchrist (2009), that some cultures will have developed one of 
them to the expense of the other. 
 
There is a great deal more to do here, and surely a true cross-cultural comparison of human/non-
human relationship will always escape the most sensitive anthropology, for everyone sees, in the end, 
through their own eyes. That the notion of a felt need to reconcile the human and the material finds 
resonance across very wide gulfs of geography and time was an earlier theme of mine (McLeish 2014) in 
a close reading of nature poetry in The Book of Job. Admittedly a foundational document of later 
Judeo-Christian tradition, this ancient Semitic text still escapes historical identification, and its origin is 
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very distant from the cultural framing of anything we might call ‘science’, yet readers today recognise its 





Several reviews quite rightly, but gently, take me to task for announcing a titular theme of poetry then 
remaining all but silent about it. There are of course other reasons than a cover announcement for the 
need of serious work on poetry itself under the theme of the book. Huber locates the very origin of the 
Two Cultures divide – one of the hanging historical questions - with poetry itself (rather than in the 
novel or visual art). Barnie challenges my over-general claim that science has not, in contrast to 
Wordsworth’s hope and vision, inspired poetry, and adduces examples past, present and personal to 
make his case (I am grateful beyond words for the vision of a sifted flour-mist of angels). Whitworth 
calls on Coleridge’s distinction of ‘imagination’ and ‘fancy’ to describe respectively a grasping of reality 
and expressive whimsy, that parallels Fuller’s apposition of representation and expression. Both Fuller 
and Barnie see in poetry a medium which is its message, I think meant to present a stark contrast to 
science. Science is represented, expressed and transmitted in many media, however, some of which lie 
closer to, or are more entangled with, the message they embody (I would claim that an example of a 
scientific blurring of medium and message is found in the mathematical instantiation of a theory in 
physics, for example). We must continue a discussion that holds poetry and science alongside each 
other.  
 
The literature contains a long, tense, but fascinating historical discussion of how poetry and science 
relate. Goethe thought that science arose from poetry, Poe and Keats cried that science eviscerated 
poetry like a vulture on so much carrion, or that it unravelled the wonder of a rainbow like a truculent 
toddler destroying the knitting (in support, perhaps, of Huber’s contention). Adding to Barnie’s 
examples, on the other hand, late modern scientist and poet Miroslav Holub thought that the two 
activities shared both discovery and energy, while early modern metaphysical poet John Donne drew on 
science as poetically enriching. 
 
The reason that I put poetry on the title page of PaMoS was really that it describes my running 
hypothesis of form throughout the discussion. If poetry is the creative meeting of imaginative energies 
and ideas with the shaping constraint of form, then what could act as a better metaphor for the scientific 
imperative to describe the world in layered and connected details? In other words, what could call upon 
greater imaginative energies than the invitation to re-imagine the universe, and what could constitute a 
tighter constraint of form than to conform that imagination to the universe we observe? Science as  
poetry, or perhaps as a single, collaborative, and polyvocal poem. The reworking of the expression of a 
scientific hypothesis (I do not agree with Fuller that I, or scientists in general are ‘receptionists’ in his 
sense for just this reason) under the constraints of observation, and indeed of aesthetic, are mapped by 
many writers onto the acts of re-crafting in theatre, literature, visual arts or music. A nice example with 
an educational theme is given by Nichols and Stephens (2013). 
 
Revisting again, thanks to Huber, the 19th century forerunner of PaMoS, of Robert Hunt’s The Poetry 
of Science, we learn more. Science is poetical for Hunt, as Huber points out, not because it shares a 
comparable creative process, as I suggest in PaMoS, but because like poetry it can evoke senses of 
beauty, wonder and the sublime. Hunt, like Wordsworth, is careful to point out that this power is 
conditional, but unlike the poet this is not the social condition of a shared familiarity in feeling and 
suffering of the objects of science, but a qualitative requirement on its form. The aesthetic power of 
science is latent, for Hunt, in its induction of connective laws rather than the prior material of listed 
facts. Huber helps us to notice the same idea expressed in different ways by William Whewell’s ‘pearls 
on a string’ that connect observations by their underlying patterns, but by the time we hear Whewell’s 
description of this process the ‘imposition of formal unity’, not only are we far from Fuller’s 
‘receptionist’ science and back to the manifest ‘expression’ of induction, but also I think meeting with a 
Romantic form of the ‘science as poetry’ metaphor. Science is never ‘read off’ nature, but ‘written into’ 
a picture, a narrative, or abstract constructed representation of it.  
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Barnie’s personal account is rich in its articulation of another running metaphor for the creative process 
in poetry, which I think does bear resemblance to one path to ideation in science – that of fishing on a 
deep lake. Note that this is ‘fly-fishing’: the lure to attract poetic fragments remains on the visible 
(conscious) surface; they must swim up, unseen, to meet it. Some of those fragments were once formed 
from scientific ideas. I must quote the essential passage here: 
 
Several decades on, however, I have internalised apsects of evolutionary biology and paleoanthropology 
to the extent that they become part of my mentality and bubble up from the place where poems are 
formed in the shape of images and themes without my having to think about them. 
Comparing this with the passage from mathematician Henri Poicaré quoted in PaMoS (p.213): 
 
I could not sleep; ideas rose in crowds; I felt them come against me until two of them were clinging to 
form a small combination. In the morning … I had only to write the results, which took me a few 
hours. 
Poincaré is telling Barnie that ‘fly-fishing’ lies very much within his experience of doing mathematics. 
Furthermore, the recurrent images of ‘hidden depths’ and the ‘surfacing’ of ideas speaks of the 
unconscious mind once again, and the need to place readings, experiences, and ideas there, however ill-
formed and from however widely-scattered sources, if creative combinations are to surface weeks and 
even years later. Poetry, by its compositional practice of focused contemplation, reveals the experience 
of our subconscious creative realm more than any other art, and by that offers the practice of science a 
reflective model that illuminates, and might n future transform, our compositional processes as well. 
 
Personal methodological and aesthetic comparison of poetry and science can perhaps be best testified 
to by those who are both scientists and poets. Very recently a (multi-) biographical study on this topic 
has been written by Sam Illingworth (2019), who draws our attention to the personally-felt connections 
to which his subjects can uniquely testify. Ada Lovelace, mathematician and daughter of Lord Byron, 
and herself a poet, writes of the ‘white wings of imagination’, when she thinks about science. She also 
confesses that her best personal preparation for composing poetry would be a week of mathematical 
work.  Astronomer Rebecca Elson makes poems that reveal and articulate the inside of her science 
thinking and feeling in much the same way. The exemplars resonate with Barnie’s personal account of 
the way that poetic ideas float up into his consciousness from an ocean-bottom he knows contains long-
submerged and sunk concepts from science. But they float up partial and incomplete – another honest 
sharing that poet Ruth Padel observed (Padel 2011), commenting on her 2012 anthology Mara 
Crossing: 
 
The deepest thing science and poetry share, perhaps, is the way they can tolerate uncertainty. They 
have a modesty in common: they do not have to say they're right. True, perhaps. Or just truer. "A 
scientist should be the first to say he doesn't know," a tiger biologist told me when I asked some 
detail of tiger behaviour. "A scientist goes forward towards truth but never gets there." 
To end the incompleteness that this section must live with, I am delighted to report that, since 
publication of the book, I have received several unsolicited offerings of recently-published science-
inspired poetry. Some are very good indeed, among them the Californian Mary Peelan’s Quantum 
Heresies (2019) and the English North-Easterner Katrina Porteous’ Edge (2019). These are poets who 
have dived deep into the science they write about, and made their home with the communities of 
scientists who listen, observe and imagine. Strikingly, both also adopt a powerful minimalist form. In 
Porteous’ case the collaborations extended to musician Peter Zinovieff, whose music forms part of the 
poems’ public performances. The role poetry plays within the larger work of sharing science as well as 
conceiving it is articulated in her introduction to Edge: 
 
So these poems have an epistemological element: they are not just about what we know, but about 
how we know. The relation between scientific empiricism and poetic idealism fascinates me. In each 
case, I found myself writing my way towards a crude understanding of the subject, just as I would if I 
were grappling with a difficult human experience. The struggle to understand was also the effort to 
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forge a language in which to interrogate the subject. Since understanding was never more than 
proximate, the aim of each piece is not to convey accurate scientific information, but rather to 
translate the experience of trying to understand. As in any poem, my intention is not to explain 
anything, only to evoke some things. Much of this is achieved through metaphor, and through the 
physicality of sound. 
 
I believe that in such effort of engagement, labour (which is necessary as much to the poet as to the 
scientist) we hear an answer to Wordsworth’s (1802) call for science-inspired poetry,  
 
The remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the Botanist, or Mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the 
Poet’s art as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should ever come when these things shall 
be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of these 
respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings. 
 
It is the haptic, immersed, visualised, sensed and heard qualities of the material world that, when 




Differences in the Creative and Imaginative Process of Art and Science  
 
If my goal was originally to swim against the tide of prevalent narrative – that there is no ‘creativity’ in 
science – and if I attempted to do this by emphasising similarities between art and science (though I 
never, as some readers extrapolate, claim that they are ‘identical’), then it is not surprising that another 
common thread in the responses is a cry to respect the differences. I think here that Zon provides a 
helpful framing of ‘translation’ and ‘interpretation’ for what I was trying to do. I don’t know if I 
succeeded, but I recognised on reading his review the degree to which ‘translating’ between the accounts 
of artists and scientists, and ‘interpreting’ the one to the other, is more faithful to my project than 
notions of ‘identity’, ‘similarity’ or ‘difference’. Furthermore, Zon’s introduction of Walter Pater’s 
notion of anderstreben extends the idea that science and art can ‘seek the other’, not to establish a static 
framework of comparison, but more to sustain a dialogue between their projects (or ‘kingdoms’ as 
Barnie would term them), much as do the science-informed poets Quinn and Porteous. 
 
I have already responded to Fuller’s charge that I see science as ‘receptive’, and can even agree with him 
that both art and science find commonality in the ‘godlike’ human empowerment to ‘generate our own 
creations’. I cannot agree, however, that the resolution of ‘reception’ versus ‘expression’ is a binary one 
in either art or science, so as Fuller anticipates, I also disagree with Kuhn (1969) on his analysis of 
difference. Art does not have to be explicitly representational in order to respond to received stimulus, 
or to the potential connectivity between others’ ideas. Likewise science neither relies entirely on 
deduction from external observations nor bears the interpretation of data-free projection onto the 
world. Furthermore, were Kuhn correct, we would expect continuous dispute over the meaning and 
definition of art (why should pure ‘expression’ of internal creations be beholden to any external 
convention), while steady agreement on the constitution of science (if externally defined there is no 
room for individual negotiation of territory). Although there has indeed been a running discussion on 
what does, and does not, count as art (e.g. Carey 2006), there is even now a fierce debate on whether 
untestable theories in theoretical high energy physics (such as ‘string theory’) ought to be admitted as 
‘science’ (Hossenfelder 2018). One of the most serious criticisms of Kuhn’s (1966) theory of ‘paradigm 
revolutions’ was provoked and witnessed by earlier instantiations of just this experience of contradictory 
paradigms running alongside each other (Masterman 1970). There is, however, a difference of degree at 
work here. The fulcrum which balances the ‘extramission’ of generation and the ‘intromission’ of 
reception, and the degree to which the resulting progeny are representational of the world, is admittedly, 
and by convention, placed at different points in art and science.  
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This variation seems, however, to be as large within the arts and sciences themselves: some sciences at 
are highly speculative and even deliberately counter-factual. The widely different degree of deployment 
of counter-factuals has been identified as a fundamental methodological divergence between physics 
and biology, for example (Poon 2006). This distinction is coloured, however, by the degree to which 
these two sciences are differently balanced between experimental and theoretical approaches in the 
implied activity of creative art and science. Zon directs our reflections away from abstract, conceptual 
and nominative thinking towards the grammar of the verbal – he recalls Chris Small’s active and 
participative definition of ‘musicking’ and wishes that it were possible ‘to science’. But author and 
screenplay writer Andy Weir (2015) has anticipated him: in the film version of The Martian, astronaut 
Mark Watney, inadvertently abandoned on Mars, declares to his empty otherworldly home that in the 
face of overwhelming odds, he is going to ‘science the shit of out this’. There follows an intense 
sequence of coordinated creative thought and activity that directs plant biology, atmospheric chemistry 
and astrophysics to the purpose of human survival on an alien world. The scene is almost balletic. 
 
Both art and science call on haptic and manual facility as well as the conceptual and cognitive, but in 
different ways and to different degrees. An experimental physicist may spend considerable time 
arranging optical components on a vibration-free table, or a biologist delicately manipulating 
fluorescently labelled components in a cell. A theoretician is more likely to be engaging in the delicate 
interplay of conceptual models and their mathematical representation, loosely-coupled (at least at first) 
to the constraints of acquired data. As great a difference separates a theatrical director working with a 
cast of actors in rehearsal, and a composer working on a symphonic score. Here the request to 
distinguish with a lot more care the different meanings of ‘imagination’ and ‘creativity’, by Whitworth, is 
very helpful. The historical analysis in his survey is fascinating. Here I think that a brief consideration of 
the disparate activities required in the complete process of bringing works of art or science into being 
relegates ‘imagination’ to a part of the totality of a process of ‘creation’. Creativity manifests in a shared, 
outward, artefactual product, while ‘imagination’ refers to the inward and mental. As in the Martian, it is 
the choreographing of the two, once more the meeting of the extramissive and intromissive, the 
coordination of expression and reception, that conceives the creative act in totality. 
 
There are other axes of difference along which the reviews seek to place art and science at different 
places; indeed just listing them suggests (to a mildly mathematical mind) a multidimensional analysis of 
their relation. The forgoing has very briefly considered those of interpretation-translation, expression-
reception, contemplative-active and extramissive-intromissive. Other contrasts suggested by reviewers 
include the historical, social and institutional framings that constitute other sections of this response, but 
further dimensions raised, that might also be topics for future discussion, include the axis of individual-
team labour (see brief discussion in the next section), subconscious-conscious activity, temporary-lasting 
value of their products (Barnie speaks to this), the degree to which aesthetics play out in creative 
process, and the extent of overlap of medium and message (Fuller, Barnie and Hugill). The last was 
responded to very briefly above under ‘Poetry’, but is a fascinating question that ought to attract a great 




Social and Institutional Framings of Science and Art 
 
We must, however, think a little more about social framings. There is clear crossover between this set of 
topics and issues in the history of science, but when social and institutional structures and norms play 
out more strongly, we move the disciplinary focus of discussion into sociology, politics and ‘science and 
technology studies’, as well as the wider ‘history and philosophy of science’. Here is the place where we 
need to call on Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos and the late 20th century story of the story of 
science. As a point of personal clarification, I have indeed read these authors (some reviewers assume 
otherwise for unstated reasons) – and, perhaps unusually – I really have no idea how many scientists 
read even the very elementary philosophy of science canon - made a point of doing so early in my 
professional scientific research career. I was very curious to discover how people thought science 
worked at that point (and of course still am), and also guessed that the years’ experience ‘on the inside’ 
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might provide me with a critical store of data against which to assess those who attempt to describe the 
process from the outside. So Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been a companion 
volume to me (although Comments on the Relations of Science and Art has not – for which many 
thanks to Fuller for drawing our attention to his perspective on the Two Culture’s poles). 
 
Some of the discussion of differences in science and art have been discussed above, but here I need to 
complete the work of correcting the impression Fuller has that I believe that both are about 
‘representation’, rather than ‘expression’. Indeed my whole thesis is that ‘creativity’ in science draws 
from the ‘expressive’ propensities and energies of human engagement with materiality. The metaphor 
of vision is apposite once more (PaMoS chapter 3) – neither intromission nor extramission alone will 
do, but the combination of the two. We project in science as much as we receive, and seek to explore 
meetings, even the most fleeting and ephemeral ones, between expression and impression. 
‘Representation’ surely emerges from the meeting of these duals.  So, although art and science, and 
essentially their products, are doubtless institutionally framed in different ways, I do not see that to 
categorise one as expressive (purely) and the other as representational (purely) is faithful to the 
experience of their communities of practice, nor that they constitute a proper pair of opposites. My 
Leitmotif of ‘creativity with constraint’ serves to underline the point. Scientific theories are expressed 
not sketched in charcoal from a clear vision of material reality, though they are constrained by a desire 
to represent in most cases (but even this is not true in the case of physics’ penchant for the invention of 
alternative universes), guided by impressions of observation or experiment. Again, the long theological 
history of ideas provides a background to the scientific/artistic meeting of the external and internal – 
following the epistemological shift from Augustine to Aquinas as a transition from revelation to 
rationality. One reason that Grosseteste interests me so much is that his thinking seems to draw on a 
balance between such internal and external sources of imagination that breaks rather effectively late 
modern and exclusive dualisms such as Fuller’s proposal. 
 
The dualistic framing of internal and external carries the discussion to a related duality within the social 
framing of science – namely between individual and community. Given the recurrent imputation of the 
world ‘hero’ in the reviews (when the word does not arise at all in PaMoS), I need to be clearer than I 
was there on where I stand in respect of the ‘great man’ narrative of science: I do not subscribe to it. I 
had hoped that the drawing on as many ‘small stories’ (including my own) as those recorded by familiar 
names, would have made the point, especially when those narratives, in so far as they are personally 
known to me rather than merely edited into books, expose the communal character of science and the 
relational structures of its energies and imagination. I do quote some historical sources at length, but 
that does not imply that I am writing hagiographically.  Re-tweeting does not imply endorsement. 
Beveridge, for example, is by no means my ‘hero’. I include a summary account of his Art of Scientific 
Investigation, not because I adhere or even agree with all, or even with much, of it, but because it is 
significant that he deliberately writes in the genre of Ars Poetica, and as deliberately aims to resonate 
with respond to Henry James Art of the Novel. The topic of that chapter is the entangled story of the 
novel and scientific experiment.  
 
Once the science-heroes are heaved down from their unwarranted pedestals (a Sisyphean, but 
necessary, task for historians of science) and the dust settles, the theatre is then cleared for a proper 
discussion of communally-held and developed narratives of science within communities of practice. 
Here is where Lakatos’ ‘programmes’ resonate more faithfully with me than either of Kuhn’s ‘normal’ 
or ‘revolutionary’ dynamics, and Fuller is right to recognise, as Kuhn did not, the repeated multiple 
coexistence of framings, as well as the multiple uses of ‘paradigm’ in his book (Margaret Masterman 
1970, counted twenty-one!). Again, I am not proposing to advance a philosophy of science, rather to 
recognise, from within the community that creates it, what meta-narratives seem faithful to my 
experience, and which not, especially in regard to the experience of imagination. The scientific 
imagination is held, and extended, communally as much as it is internalised. Of all my early readings, 
the one that I recall being most energised and convinced by was Feyerabend’s Against Method. After 30 
years of professional science, I am still more inclined to the description that ‘anything goes’ as more 
faithful to the experience of method in the scientific community’s changing notions of materiality, life 
and cosmos than any conjectures, refutations, programmes, or paradigm shifts. Leach writes of the 
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‘creativity of human social life’, which resonates with Feyerabend’s social generation of ideas, and 
especially of the way that social sub-communities within science can keep an idea alive through the 
period of gestation where strict Popperian rationalism would have demanded its abandonment. 
Communities both generate and sustain science, and more, are allowed and supported. Huber’s 
Wordsworthian notion of the ‘hard labour’ in science (as opposed to the ‘contemplative idleness’ of 
other creative activities) also speaks of a labouring community among which new ideas may surface in 
the communal conversation, rather than fully-formed in the mind of a single individual.  I have 
experienced many examples of this route to ideation.  
 
In terms of the institutional framing of science and art, again, important and even politically anguished 
though this is, such differences are not central to my purpose in PaMoS except in so far as they bear on 
the creative process. The creation of art or science is, however, not unconnected with their financial 
support, and the increasing instrumentalization reflected in current (at least UK national) science 
funding policy has the doubly-vicious consequence of tipping resources into science and technology and 
away from the arts and humanities, while at the same time requiring a twisted narrative, on behalf of 
those requesting funding, of a methodological project plan that conceals the uncontrollable and 
unmanageable in ideation and imagination. Creativity occurs, by this false and imposed narrative, on a 
scientific production line. I have elsewhere written of our modern grant-writing Scheherazades 
(McLeish 2014). The historical evolution of ‘imagination’ and ‘creativity’ that Whitworth tracks in the 
20th century emergence of ‘R&D culture’ is fascinating in this regard, for the shift of a publicly perceived 
value in ‘creativity’ from disciplines like history and literary criticism to science and technology (as in 
McGurl and Kerr) points to an underlying shift in value, but also in the meaning of ‘creativity’ itself. 
One result is that some commercial operations now find it advantageous to annex the word, becoming 
the ‘creative industries’.  
 
An implied but unarticulated consequence of PaMoS’s cry for a recognition that creativity plays a 
central role in science is that its institutional framing recognise this in evaluation, resourcing and 
formation. Fortunately this consequence has recently been developed much further by Lehmann and 
Gaskins (2019), who suggest that artistic practice provide a ‘template’ for a more explicit and structural 
consideration in science. Their proposal includes the transposition of artistic forms of heuristic practice, 
trial-and-error, self-critique, openness to accident, and environmental construction. While I think that 
these authors might underestimate the extent to which such practices already find a home in scientific 
research, their radical propositions for institutional support of art-science co-practice (including, on 
close reading, building explicit scientific contexts for the ‘fly-fishing’ of the poet that Barnie testifies to)  





Computing and Digital Creativity 
 
Hugill takes me to task for my omission of any discussion of the digital realm and its already highly-
developed role in artistic creativity, and especially in music. I have no defence but lack of expertise and 
knowledge, though one might rightly point out that that problem doesn’t seem to have prevented my 
writing about much else besides. I think his world might be a little coloured by the computational 
environment in which he himself works: to declare that ‘physics is almost entirely computational’ speaks 
more of that bias than of a knowledge of the current landscape of physics. Without diminishing the 
enormous power and application of computational simulation of matter on all scales, of the frontier 
topic of quantum computing, or of the advanced experimental instrumentation that it permits, 
computers remain a tool that physics deploys, not a dominant qualifier of the discipline.  I think that 
Hugill might have fallen into the same categorisation error (that I, at least, claim) as Fuller between the 
expressive and receptive in science. In physics computation is expressive – these are instantiations of 
our model, imagined worlds, not microscopes conveying information from the external one. Before she 
simulates or computes, a physicist conceives the question, idea, algorithm. To be sure, the interaction of 
the searching human mind with the programme and its output is a part of the continuous process of 
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creativity, but I am not sure that this is not one of degree, rather than kind, when compared to the 
traditional and historical technologies of art and science (but see the discussion above, motivated by 
Hugill and also missing from PaMoS). Hugill himself writes of computers that ‘paint beautiful paintings 
and make marvellous music, and people must find ways to negotiate relationships with the machines 
they themselves have created’, but the creation of the paintings and music is as implicit in the creation of 
the machines as it is in the wonderful artisanal account of shaping and drilling the oboe? 
 
A recent discussion that might suggest a direction to take Hugill’s helpful critique is Marcus du Sautoy’s 
Creativity Code (du Sautoy 2019). Du Sautoy, a professional mathematician and also serious amateur 
musician, considers in depth the current algorithms that generate art, music and even mathematics. 
Throughout, his account sustains the tension of the underlying question of digital creativity: are the 
machines creators in the same sense that human beings are, or are they our tools in creativity, however 
sophisticated those tools might be. In regard to music, he concludes, ‘despite the fact that these 
algorithms appear to have cracked the musical code, there is nothing stirring inside the machine. These 
are still our tools, the modern-day digital bullroarers.’ And on narrative journeys, ‘computers will be the 
telescopes and typewriters, not the storytellers.’ This is all in spite of seriously impressive accounts of 
computer-generated film-score music, sports commentary, and of course the celebrated innovations of 
DeepMind in the game of Go. Du Sautoy concludes with a brief discussion of the activity of deliberate 
choice, sense of self, and consciousness. These are, of course, the central questions raised by Artificial 




Theological Tropes in Creativity  
 
Any serious discussion, in the late modern west, of as deeply held a human values, and as long a history, 
as creativity is bound to draw on theological material, and to excite theological resonance. Not only 
PaMoS itself, but many of the reviewers’ responses testify to that expectation. The book (and the précis 
prepared for this collection) reflects on the creative implication of the imago dei tradition, the ancient 
nature-wisdom tradition of Job, and the analytical tools for teleology that theology as a discipline 
provides. Barnie presents us with a myriad of angels, Fuller writes of the cultural divide as a ‘second 
fall’, Leach of transcendence, Huber of the glory and truth of divine creation and the tradition of 
‘natural theology’, Whitworth informs us that the earliest citation of ‘creativity’ in the OED refers to 
divine activity, and Zon’s review is trinitarian and hypostatic throughout in its theme of ‘music-theology’. 
Although much of this material has fuelled discussion in the forgoing sections, here we draw some of its 
themes and questions together. 
 
To begin with it is worth recalling perhaps the primary historical creative leap from theological to 
scientific ideas: that the imagination to overcome the obstacles to experimental method drew its vision 
and energy from theological sources is now established (e.g. Harrison 2007). Whether the Christian 
concept of Fall and Redemption simply solves a problem of its own making (as Leach would have it) is 
not my concern here, but serves to shed some early-modern contextual light on the points I was trying 
to make under The End of Creativity (PaMoS p.323), and on the creative process in general. It is surely 
not only the secularism of our age that renders Harrison’s findings so strange to our ears, but principally 
the disciplinary fragmentation since then, that objects to the idea that theological ideas could build a 
conceptual bridge over a scientific chasm from the artificiality of experiment to the subtleties of nature 
(as Margaret Cavendish argued). Yet Harrison writes (quoting Glanville’s 1661 Vanity of Dogmatism), 
‘Experimental philosophy … was thus fitly described as a philosophy “that becomes the sons of Adam”’ 
(Harrison 2007, p.67). The point is not only that theological narratives are as suitable a source of 
interdisciplinary ideation as any other of the humanities’ disciplines, but that there are certain structures, 
we might without minimising call them aesthetic (in the sense of Poicaré’s subconscious filter), that 
speak to the negotiation of relationship between the human and non-human. It is in this light 
remarkable that Zon directs our attention to the hypostatic union of the Trinity as a ‘template for trying 
to understand the nature and meaning of relationships – relationships between numbers, between 
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musical notes, between words, between disciplines, between science and the arts – between what 
something is, and what something represents in the totality of its meaning.’  
 
Relationships, their making, breaking and healing, their fruitfulness and progeny, conscious and 
unconscious, lie at the heart of creation and creativity of all kinds. It is tempting to suggest that, 
irrespective of whether the categories of our thinking had inherited a centuries-long theological tradition 
or not, we would be inventing one to provide the nourishment from which this discussion has palpably 
drawn. If Fuller is correct that the tragic divorce of arts and sciences constitutes a ‘Second Fall’, if Barnie 
is right to call on poetry, and Huber’s insight that it is poetry’s theological locus that witnessed the 
parting of ways on target, if Whitworth’s emphasis on historical awareness and Zon’s hypostasis a worthy 
object of contemplation in the task, then perhaps a ‘Second Coming’ in poetic form, and in the mystical 
company of Yeats, is the appropriate and apophatic place to pause, and to reflect, for now (The Second 
Coming, Yeats 1921) 
 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre    
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere    
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst    
Are full of passionate intensity. 
 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.    
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out    
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert    
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,    
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,    
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it    
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.    
The darkness drops again; but now I know    
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,    
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,    
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
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